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From Public Goods to 
Public Accumulation?
Contemporary discussions about public goods and deve-
lopment have arisen from the reality that neo-liberal
development strategies have produced neither viable
capitalist societies in the Third World nor increased wel-
fare for its majority. Global public goods discourse has
arisen because peripheral states are seen as incapable of
performing developmental, welfare, or security tasks.
This discourse is confined to realms that do not challenge
a wavering neo-liberal hegemony. It thus avoids the con-
cepts of ›services‹ and ›basic needs‹ in favour of nebulous
notions such as ›a facilitating environment for enter-
prise‹. In harsh terms, this is little more than paving the
way for primary accumulation in the broad sense; in
narrower ones, for the privatisation of services. One way
to challenge the direction of this discourse is to raise the
possibility of ›public accumulation‹.
The Ideologies of Global Public Goods
There is a discursive battle going on within (or between –
if you think there is much difference between the World
Bank and the United Nations Development Programme
and all the others) the international financial and develop-
ment agencies about the nature of their responsibilities or
obligations vis a vis the ›development‹ of their subjects (or
is it the development of ›capitalism‹?) in the Third World.
It concerns the definition of ›public goods.‹ It is similar to
and intrinsically linked with previous – and still raging –
arguments about the meaning of ›sustainable development‹
(Wanner, forthcoming). Likewise, it is related to and
perhaps even rooted in debates about the relative primacy
of ›first and/or second generation‹ human rights. Neo-libe-
rals give capital the highest order of freedom: they are quite
willing to deny basic rights to those in the public who
would challenge capital’s freedom by expanding the notion
of freedom to include goods, services, and even the sacred
realm of production itself. (Schwarzmantel 1995).
Rosa Luxemburg’s insistence – directed at both bourgeois
democrats leery of extending their rights too far and those
who would distort the notion of a ›democratic proletarian
dictatorship‹ – that ›without a free and untrammelled press,
without the unlimited right of association and assemblage,
the rule of the broad mass of the people is entirely unthin-
kable‹ (1970 [1917-18]: 389) recognises this dilemma too.
She did not separate ›rights‹ into economic and non-eco-
nomic categories. It is doubtful, too, that she would have
separated ›goods‹ into public and private realms. How can
one take apart ›goods‹ associated with public welfare,
security measures, and environmental protection from the
politics of production and accumulation? 
This is, however, what the current public goods discourse is
about. It is about separating ›goods‹ from ›services‹, keeping
them both far apart from production and accumulation and
even further from politics and ideology. The task is not easy,
especially in the context of ›developing societies‹. As Meg-
hnad Desai tells us, while the now advanced capitalist socie-
ties developed historically, ›the provision of public goods
grew within the broader framework of an expanding role for
the state in making public provision for private as well as
public goods‹: the state helped mercantile capital out quite a
bit, as it simultaneously took over the provisioning for the
poor from churches and charities (1999: 64,67). Ironically,
this symbiotic relationship created a world in which the
›public‹ and the ›private‹ became more distinguishable and
the concept of ›public goods‹ acquired a technocratic veneer.
›Non-rival‹ and ›non-excludable‹ became the buzzwords for
public goods, and neutral states were seen to provide them in
the Keynesian days. They were seen as goods and services
that many people could use and from which they could bene-
fit without a diminishment in value, and that were difficult to
stop people from using in any case. That their provision had
less to do with bureaucrats ›gauging the preferences of con-
sumers‹ and more to do with politicians ›guessing what was
needed to keep them from revolting – an elite response to
democratic but extra-parliamentary pressure‹ was forgotten
(Desai 1999: 68).
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2Now, however, neo-liberal doctrine denies both oppor-
tunities for ›late industrialising‹ social formations. State
capitalism is frowned on. So is the democratic distribu-
tion of life chances, or even survival. Thus, within neo-
liberalism’s confines the notion of ›public goods‹ must
be restricted in so far as it is associated with state pro-
vision. Paradoxically, however, it  has to be widened to
introduce and justify the idea that capitalists can pro-
vide ›public goods‹, and also that if neither local states
nor capitalists can provide the goods, the emerging
transnational state can, perhaps in conjunction with
international capital or non-governmental organisations
(Moore, forthcoming). The World Bank can loan funds
to local states to hire transnational corporations to build
dams, water pipes and associated services. If the state can-
not collect the fees or taxes to pay for these services,
transnational companies can be hired to do that, too. Or, to get
into the realm of security (national security is seen to be the
purest of all public goods – except in the periphery; and the
Iraq invasion is as much about that as anything else), the IMF
can loan funds to a state under attack so it can hire mercenaries
to protect its oil fields, from which will come the funds to
repay the loans. Once the discourse is simultaneously widened
and narrowed, the transnational state and its organic intellec-
tuals can step in to implement ›global public goods‹ such as
›good governance‹ so that the new states can develop the
›capacity‹ to build a semblance of free-enterprise capitalism.
How many ›publics‹? How many
›privates‹?
The discourse on public goods – be they local or global – is
more about ensuring the false separation of distribution and
production than it is about restructuring a global order so that
production and its fruits are available to and under the
democratic control of the majority of the people in the world.
Instead of public goods, the discourse should be about public
accumulation. As long as accumulation is seen as ›private‹ the
›public‹ will be seen as second best. 
Furthermore, there will be two categories of this public and
the goods to serve it. The first will consist of the general
interests of capital. Its goods will be whatever its various frac-
tions cannot supply to each other without co-ordination (inclu-
ding labour), and they will be produced by whatever institu-
tions are necessary to perform their collective actions. There
will be more of a demand for public goods servicing these sec-
tors of society when the lack of them becomes evident with
various crises. For example, a ›new global financial architec-
ture‹ will be called for after crises such as hit the world in
1997 and 1998. Or, when too many Enron scandals and
Conrad Black debacles hit the headlines, capital will call on
the state to watch its ›rogue elements‹ a little more closely.
Perhaps if the AIDS crisis had affected private capital more
severely, the corporates rather than the Treatment Action
Campaign might have pushed the South African state into
action. 
The second category of publics will consist of what are com-
monly called ›the people‹. The minimum of ›public goods‹
they get will be those necessary for the relatively peaceful
reproduction of their labour, or the extraction of the natural
resources in their neighbourhoods. Some will ›trickle down‹
from the sanctums of wealth on high to augment ruling class
security or health. If too much crime threatens its members
and they can not build enough walls ›privately‹, their states
may create more police. If capital had taken AIDS seriously,
the popular classes would have gained too. Other ›public
goods› will be won through struggles – and here the example
of the TAC must be invoked – but will most likely be financed
from the people’s own taxes. There is no doubt that the
Seattles and Genoas and Social Forums of the world have
inspired the discourse on global public goods to some extent,
and that the corporate public relations experts will be transla-
ting such demands as calls for ›international financial transpa-
rency‹ rather than for decommodification. But so too have
the other ›global bads‹ such as intractable wars in Africa’s
Great Lakes region, and of course, September 11, 2001. In all
cases, there will be struggles over whether public goods are
best provided by international bodies, states, corporations,
or ›communities‹ including non-governmental organisations. 
Also in all cases, there will be little effort to link these good
with the politics of production. Even though one World Bank
report says ›many of the challenges facing poor countries have
solutions that involve the production of international public
goods‹ (World Bank 2000:181, in Stalgren 2000) they will be
considered within the realm of consumed ›services‹ to be
distributed by a process magically separated from the world
of ›production‹. The latter is considered to be within the
realm of profit and exchange, while the former – although also
consisting of ›goods‹ with a substantial degree of ›use value‹
–  are considered to be less than profitable, and less practical
to consider in the realm of pure competition (after all, it is
difficult to conceive of people walking to a ›market‹ where
there is a choice of different water pipes to bring the stuff
in from Lesotho) and thus in the public domain. The contradic-
tion rests in the fact that although less and less is said in
›public‹ documents about the domain of ›private profit‹, the
realm of profit spreads further and deeper into what used to
be called ›public‹ goods, services or institutions – the cases
of water privatisation, rubbish removal and more fees for
universities are only small examples. The privatisation of the
public realm leads to the diminishment of the latter, and  thus
to more and more public problems, so the issue of ›public
goods‹ continues to surface and international development
discourse ties itself up in knots. This is most apparent when the
question of the state arises.
3States and goods – and good states
At its most basic level, the separation between public and
private is hoist on its own petards. The dominant discourse in
international development would have us believe that the
most important ›universal public good‹ is the establishment of
private property rights (World Bank 1997, Moore 1999). The
intellectuals in the institutions producing such discourse now
acknowledge that such rights do not evolve ›naturally‹ and
›organically‹ so public institutions – that is, states, be they local
or global, or, inevitably a mix of both – are needed to coerce and
codify transformations within social systems not determined
by private property to those structured by it. Furthermore, insti-
tutions of some sort or another are necessary to mediate the
contradictions of such processes. In other words, it is now clear-
ly recognised, although not clearly stated, that neo-liberalism
is ›the mobilisation of state power in the contradictory exten-
sion and reproduction of market(-like) rule‹, as Tickel and Peck
put it (2003). 
If, as many theorists of public goods suggest, ‘the market’ is a
global public good – a carefully constructed ensemble of insti-
tutions rather than a spontaneous eruption – should global
managers create it with what are effectively states of their own? 
But this state – be it local or international: if local states can’t
be good governors, then the transnational one can! – has a
clear and limited role. It must create the market by creating
private property. The private becomes public and the public
becomes private. 
Public goods and human security 
on a global scale?
The linguistic battles one sees in the international ›develop-
ment‹ institutions are about embedding and legitimising the
illusion that the neo-liberal interpretation of rights is the best
one, and that the only rights worth protecting – indeed, produ-
cing – are property rights. This is the process of ›original accu-
mulation‹: even when it was relatively easy, as in the birthpla-
ce of capitalism, it entailed huge proportions of violence and
needed a lot of wealth taken from what is now the Third World
to help it – and it needed the ›new worlds‹ of North America
and the Antipodes to send surplus population off to. As did
Luxemburg, the World Bank (etc.) now realises how important
the state is to the production of public goods and rights accom-
panying the violent process of capita- lism’s construction. Rosa
Luxemburg’s robust critique of Lenin and Trotsky’s willingness
to substitute force for democracy is matched only by her reco-
gnition of their difficulties in using a state to assist the march of
history forward. She hoped that an equivalent to an internatio-
nal socialist state would hasten the democratisation of that
march. She would have no difficulty in imagining the rise of
today’s transnational capitalist state (amidst contending ›natio-
nal‹ ones) and its many agencies like the World Bank in pushing
forward the integration of ›natural economies‹ into the world
capitalist system (Luxemburg 1968 [1913]: 368-467). She
would not hide the role of states in such a process or prevarica-
te about it. 
In contrast, neo-liberal propagandists who simultaneously
need and distrust the local state and thus offer the internatio-
nal one as a substitute, hesitate to talk about it. Their hypocri-
tical invocation of the notion of sovereignty while dispensing
with it – or, to be more accurate, using it very selectively –
almost echoes Luxemburg’s disparaging comments about
›self-reliance‹ for peripheral capitalist states. (She might have
equivocated about semi-peripheral, potentially sub-imperialist
South Africa’s – 1976 [1916]: 289-291). Without such a stern
critic they are able to pursue the anodyne notion of public
goods – global at that – to hide the creation of a transnational
state. 
Aside from concealing the emergence of a transnational
state (let us avoid the charge of conspiracy theory here), the
controversies and conflicts involved in identifying and pro-
visioning public goods are multiplied at the global level.
There is no central state to mediate hegemonic conflicts over
the nature of these resources and conditions. Yet with issues
ranging from the environment to cross-border health concerns
like HIV-AIDS (de Waal 2003), and from war and humanita-
rian disasters (Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty,
2001) to crime to the contagion of financial crises, ›globalisa-
tion‹ brings the public goods debates to the world stage. That
the early 2002 Monterrey Consensus meetings were slated
to discuss global public goods, but did not, suggests ideologi-
cal tension around their conceptualisation. 
In the meantime, the soft liberals among the organic intellec-
tuals for the transnational state, such as Amartya Sen, help in the
quest for GPGs with ›human security‹ discourse. Sen’s co-chai-
red United Nations commission on Human Security (Sen 1999,
United Nations 2003) is replete with examples of the terrible
consequences of the neglect of the victims of war and poverty
in the Third World, but as with Sen’s academic work it pulls
back from advocacy of robust popular democracy (Hamilton
1999) to a plea for better ethics on behalf of the world’s ruling
classes. It is ironic, but symptomatic, that key members of
the commission were South Africans. Frene Ginwala, South
Africa’s Speaker of Parliament, was a commissioner, and the
deputy director and project co-ordinator for the report’s ‘deve-
lopment’ half (‘conflict’ was the other) was Viviene Taylor,
chair of South Africa’s Taylor Report on the Basic Income
Grant. 
Accumulation goods and global 
conjunctures
Work is a public good. However, it is clear that even in advan-
ced capitalist countries the technology intensive leading sec-
tors of the ›private‹ economy do not create many jobs, and it
costs a lot to create them. In the United States, government
employees exceed those in manufacturing by 5,129,000
4(Harper’s 2003: 11). The rest, one assumes, are McJobs and
the professions supported in great style by the productivity of
the manufacturing jobs and the computer nerds increasing that
productivity. The fact that the American state is highly protec-
tionist and militarist illustrates that for its rulers, the state is a
legitimate definer of ›public goods‹ and those goods include
jobs for some workers and profits for some capitalists. Yet for
countries like South Africa, hesitation to provide ›handouts‹
does not translate into a strong desire to create jobs (except
before elections, when a few million menial public works
tasks are promised over a period of five years). The fear of
creating state industries – and perhaps of a resultant confident
working class to work in them – paralyses the state from any
meaningful action at all. Public accumulation is the only way
to solve the problem of public goods: but this will not happen
in the foreseeable future. It will take a global depression, or a
world-wide war and its aftermath, before the conditions for
such possibilities appear. As Meghnad Desai has put it, in ›the
future, we must expect that action on global public goods will
happen only to the extent that the international community
faces a crisis and must respond‹ (Desai 1999: 74). 
Those articulating notions of ›global public goods‹ beyond the
merely technocratic to restart distorted primitive accumulation
processes (alongside nation-state formation and democratisati-
on) just might be able to steer a fragile trajectory to a different
path. The idea of full employment as a public good, justifying
sophisticated industrial strategies to absorb primitive accumu-
lation’s new proletarians, and involving new capitalist classes
in productive instead of wasteful pursuits, could take root.
At least it could help prepare the ground for the moment of
hegemonic collapse and the crisis in its wake. 
For now, however, states – with the help of progressive global
intellectuals and the world’s ensembles of civil society – are
responsible for solving their crises of livelihoods and
democracy. With sufficient political pressure they could be
forced to do so. 
Yet even without those progressive pressures from inside and
below and with reactionary ones from outside and above,
there is almost ideological consensus that the state should
expend funds on education, a ›public good‹ that is a sine qua
non of ›development‹. In order to ›build capacity‹ for private
capitalism, state capitalism, or welfare capitalism (or most of
all, democratic socialism) a more than basic educational
system is necessary. This is the very minimum of the many
public goods necessary for any development. But to even
consider its implementation, one encounters a whole gamut
of other needs. Food, water, shelter, health and parents (who
are not dying from AIDS) are what the children need. Their
teachers need decent schools to teach in and be trained them-
selves. All of these cannot be conjured up and ›distributed‹.
No matter how hard one tries, one cannot escape the need
for public production. Public production is the ultimate
public good.
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